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Abstract 
 Although it is often implicitly assumed by track two practitioners that track two eff orts are complemen-
tary to official negotiations and are welcomed by official actors, little is known about the actual percep-
tions of these efforts by official parties, especially in the context of non-Western countries. Turkey, as one 
of these countries, was exposed to numerous track two efforts in the last decade. A survey of Turkish 
diplomats was conducted to explore how interventions by American- and European-based track two 
actors are perceived by the track one community in a developing and non-Western country. Th e Turkish 
diplomats’ perceptions are organized around four categories: who are the track two actors, contributions 
of track two diplomacy, problems caused by track two diplomacy, and ideas concerning track two-track 
one cooperation. Th en, the perceptions of Turkish and American diplomats are compared to assess 
whether their perceptions of track two diplomacy differ and, if so, in what particular ways they differ. Th e 
theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed and ideas for future research proposed. 
 Keywords 
 cooperation between track one and track two diplomacy, complementarity, Turkish diplomats 
 Introduction 
Unofficial encounters among representatives of groups that are in conflict with 
each other (known as track two diplomacy) in the hope of affecting official nego-
tiations (known as track one diplomacy) have been carried out with increasing 
frequency over the last two decades. It is often implicitly assumed by track two 
practitioners that track two efforts are complementary to official negotiations and 
that they are welcomed by official actors. Little is known, however, about the 
actual perceptions of the official parties concerning these efforts, especially in the 
context of non-Western countries. Th is study tries to remedy this deficiency by 
presenting evidence from a survey of  Turkish diplomats on their views of track 
two efforts and comparing these to a similar survey of American diplomats. 
*) Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak is an Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department of Bilkent 
University.
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 Track two diplomacy has increasingly been recognized as an innovative means 
of third party intervention in international and intra-national conflicts. Th is 
term, ‘track two diplomacy,’ was first coined by Joseph Montville as referring to 
“unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations 
that aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human 
and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (1987: 7). 
Other terms were also used by various scholars, i.e. multi-track diplomacy (Dia-
mond and McDonald 1996); unofficial diplomacy (Volkan et al. 1991); sustained 
dialogue (Saunders 1999); and interactive conflict resolution (Fisher 1997) to 
refer to similar conflict resolution activities – activities that are often facilitated 
by a third party and are of an unofficial and interactive nature. In this article, 
the term ‘track two diplomacy’ is used interchangeably with ‘unofficial diplo-
macy.’ It refers to a variety of non-governmental and unofficial forms of conflict 
resolution activities between the representatives of adversarial groups that aim to 
de-escalate conflict, improve communication and understanding between the 
parties, and develop innovative ideas to be used in ‘track one.’ Th e term ‘track 
one,’ or ‘official diplomacy,’ is used to refer to peacemaking activities conducted 
by officially appointed people (e.g. diplomats), governmental agencies (e.g. dip-
lomatic and defense organizations), and inter-governmental organizations (e.g. 
UN or NATO). 
 Recently, there are signs of growing interest and recognition among track one 
actors towards track two actors and their activities.1 At the same time, an effort to 
reach out to the track one community is visible in the track two community. Th e 
necessity of relating and contributing to track one have always been articulated, 
theoretically, as an important goal by various track two scholars and practitioners. 
Volkan (1991: 12), for example, emphasized the importance of the ‘crucial junc-
ture,’ referring to a state in which official and unofficial diplomacy interacts with 
one another and searches for ways to improve this interaction. Other scholar-
practitioners, such as Fisher (1997), Kelman (1995), and Mitchell (1993) discussed 
conditions – especially pertaining to the selection of workshop participants – under 
which the successful ‘transfer’2 of ideas from track two workshops to the policy-
making level can be realized. In a recent attempt to further elaborate transfer, a 
collection of articles by Fitzduff and Church (2004) discussed cases and strategies 
through which NGOs managed to influence policy processes in peace related 
issues in different parts of the world. Th ey differentiate between two types of 
strategies that NGOs use to influence policymaking processes around the globe: 
‘insider strategies,’ which refer to working alongside the policymaking circles; and 
1)  As examples for growing interest towards track two actors, see for example “Secretary’s Open Forum” 
organized by the Department of State in 2002, and the “Track One-Track Two Symposium” organized 
with the sponsorship of the United States Institute of Peace on 24 November 2003.
2) For a detailed discussion of this concept see Cuhadar (2004) and Fisher (1997).
INER 12,1_f4_56-82.indd   58 5/10/07   8:01:36 PM
 C. E. Çuhadar Gürkaynak / International Negotiation 12 (2007) 57–82 59
‘outsider strategies,’ which refer to working with people outside the decision-
making circles and placing external pressure. Th ey finally argue that different 
cases call for different combinations of these approaches. 
 Besides the scholarly work on how track two can relate to and influence track 
one, there is a growing literature on complementarity and coordination of track 
one and track two activities (Crocker et al. 1999, Kriesberg 1996, Nan 2000). In 
addition to this growing scholarly literature, recently members of both communi-
ties have sought forums to find out how to put these ideas into practice more 
effectively.3 Th e fact that more frequent interactions take place between the mem-
bers of track two and track one communities in these forums is a positive step 
towards establishing dialogue and identifying ways to make peacemaking efforts 
more complementary and coordinated. However, the increasing level of interac-
tions also raises further issues that need to be analyzed and tackled. 
 While track one and track two communities communicate with each other to 
increase complementarity and coordination, their interaction is often influenced 
by their perceptions towards each other, which are shaped by past experiences, 
norms and values of the professional culture they belong to, and national 
differences. Th ese differences can potentially constitute a barrier to effective com-
munication and coordination between the two communities. Th e barriers may be 
highlighted even more when the interlocutors of the US or European based track 
two practitioners are mostly track one communities of developing and ‘non-Western’ 
countries.4 Furthermore, despite the fact that most of the track two practice is car-
ried out in countries other than the US and Europe, attempts to understand the 
views of track one communities in these countries and to involve them in the 
recently flourishing track one-track two dialogue are inadequate. Although track 
two diplomacy is carried out in many different parts of the world with very 
different cultural groups (official and unofficial), the topic has hardly been stud-
ied cross-culturally. Practitioners such as McDonald (1991: 216) have neither 
adequately addressed this gap nor have raised concerns related to the implications 
of applying track two diplomacy across different cultures. McDonald advised 
unofficial American diplomats to acquire patience, humility, and a detailed 
knowledge of the issue and the area before entering negotiations. Although such 
advice is very valuable for unofficial diplomats, especially on a practical level, 
there is still need for a more analytical effort to understand the dynamics of track 
one-track two relationship in ‘non-Western’ countries. 
3)  See endnote 1. 
4) Most of the international track two practitioners are based in the developed world such as the US 
or Europe. Indeed, the theory and practice of track two was initiated in these countries. However, most 
of the conflicts they deal with exist in developing countries in other parts of the world. Here I use 
the terms ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ as general categories to refer to this specific distinction. Th e term 
‘non-Western’ does not necessarily mean that the country is not modernized nor has no elements of 
Western culture in it. A good example to this would be Turkey where the modernization process has been 
going on for more than a century and where one can easily find many basic elements of the Western culture.
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 In light of this void, this article offers a survey of Turkish diplomats to explore 
two questions. Th e first is how outside intervention by US and European-based track 
two actors is perceived by the track one community of a developing, non-Western 
country, which often lies at the receiving end rather than the service-providing 
end of this relationship. Th e second question, related to the first, is whether the 
perceptions of Turkish and US diplomats towards track two diplomacy differ 
and, if so, in what particular ways. 
 Th e research that answers these questions is presented in four parts. Th e first 
part discusses the rationale of carrying out this research in Turkey and the meth-
odology. Th e second part presents the research findings with regard to the percep-
tion of Turkish diplomats towards track two efforts in four categories: a) who the 
‘legitimate’ actors of track two diplomacy are, b) the contributions of track two 
diplomacy, c) harms caused by track two diplomacy, and d) ideas concerning 
track two-track one cooperation. Th e third section compares the findings from 
the survey of Turkish diplomats with the findings from a group of American 
diplomats5. Finally, the last section of the article discusses the theoretical and 
practical implications, focusing on whether there are any measures that the track 
two actors can take in order to improve cooperation with track one actors of the 
‘receiver’ and ‘non-Western’ countries. 
 Rationale and Conduct of the Research 
 Chataway’s survey (1998, 1999) of American diplomats was the first systematic 
and scholarly analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of track one diplomats 
towards track two diplomacy. Th e findings of her research offer important insights 
that can form the basis of a comparative analysis with diplomats in a different 
social and political context. My research with the Turkish diplomats was designed 
with the purpose of such a comparison in mind. 
 In January and February 1999, 27 in-depth interviews were conducted with 
diplomats at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with some follow-up inter-
views conducted later in the summer of 2000.6 Th e group included 6 women and 
21 men, all of whom had at least 10 years of diplomatic experience. Th e inter-
views aimed to understand the attitudes of Turkish diplomats towards track two 
diplomacy, especially how they perceive ‘outside’ intervention by North Ameri-
can and Western European unofficial actors. In order to make the comparison 
with American diplomats more focused and structured, the interview questions 
5) Th is research was highly inspired by a similar survey, conducted by Cynthia Chataway, among a group 
of American diplomats. However, for the comparative section in this paper, the data on American diplo-
mats were obtained from the publication of the research findings in Cynthia Chataway, “Track II Diplo-
macy from a Track I Perspective,” Negotiation Journal, July 1998, pp 269–286, rather than from the 
original data set used by the author. 
6)  Chataway also used a sample of same size. 
INER 12,1_f4_56-82.indd   60 5/10/07   8:01:37 PM
 C. E. Çuhadar Gürkaynak / International Negotiation 12 (2007) 57–82 61
were similar to those used by Chataway and the sample for the interviews was also 
formed similarly to hers.7 A group of Turkish diplomats more knowledgeable 
about track two processes were selected and contacted. Th e rest of the diplomats 
were selected randomly by snowball sampling. Interviews were conducted in Turk-
ish; they were transcribed and translated into English and coded using the same 
general themes used by Chataway in her coding.8 However, some new themes 
emerged in the Turkish sample that did not exist in the American sample, which 
I will discuss in detail in the next two sections. Th emes are reported based on 
their frequency, which is narrated in general terms as ‘all-many-most’ (which 
indicates the most frequent theme mentioned by more than half of the group), 
‘some’ (which indicates the middle point on a general scale between many and 
few), and ‘few’ (which indicates the least frequently mentioned themes). 
 Th e reason Turkey was selected for this project is that, when this research was 
underway, Turkey was afflicted by many conflicts (some violent) both nationally 
and regionally, such as the Kurdish conflict, the Cypriot conflict, and the turmoil 
in the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey was the subject of numerous unofficial 
interventions pertaining to these conflicts in the last couple of decades that were 
carried out either solely by the US or European based organizations and practi-
tioners or by these ‘outsiders’ in collaboration with local NGOs and practitioners. 
Th e intensive exposure of the Turkish diplomats to unofficial actors in the last 
decade made this country an interesting case for the analysis of track one-track 
two interaction in a periphery country context. As mentioned before, track two 
theory and practice first emerged in the US and Western Europe, where civil 
society is more developed and the financial resources for such activities are abun-
dant. As opposed to the US or some European countries that can be seen as ‘core 
countries’ or ‘global service providers’ of track two efforts, Turkey can be seen as 
a ‘periphery country’ or located at the ‘receiving’ end.9 Th erefore, diplomats of 
countries such as Turkey experienced track two activities more passively, either as 
observers of these efforts organized by foreign actors or as targets of such ‘outside’ 
interventions. Given this context, this research has been based on the assumption 
that the perception of track two diplomacy by track one diplomats in Turkey is 
likely to differ from those in the US or Europe, where the idea and practice was 
initiated but seldom applied to conflicts of their own. 
7) Chataway first interviewed eight diplomats who were very knowledgeable about track two processes. 
Out of the 26 interviewees, she selected the rest of the diplomats randomly. See Chataway 1998, p. 271 
for the details of her research methodology. Also see Ibid. p.286 for the interview questions used by the 
author.
8) Chataway coded the interviews for: 1) definitions and distinctions made between unofficial and official 
diplomacy; 2) perceived contributions and dangers of track two; 3) future projections regarding the uses 
and abuses of track two. 
9)  I would like to thank the anonymous referee for suggesting the terms ‘global service provider’ and 
‘receiver.’ 
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 Perceptions of Turkish Diplomats 
 Who are the ‘Legitimate’ Actors of Track Two Diplomacy? 
 With regard to their perception of potential and legitimate track two actors, dip-
lomats can be divided into two groups: those who defined the track two actors 
broadly and those who defined them narrowly. Diplomats who defined the track 
two actors in a broad way recognized a wide range of actors as potential and 
legitimate track two actors. Most of them considered NGOs, civil society organi-
zations, businessmen, citizens, media, independent research institutions, and 
conflict resolution professionals as potential actors. Diplomats who viewed the 
actors of track two diplomacy from a broader perspective also recognized that 
track one has changed to a great extent, in the sense that official diplomacy alone 
is not sufficient anymore in tackling contemporary international conflicts. Th ose 
who chose to state a reason for the insufficiency of official diplomacy mentioned 
the increasing specialization, complexity, and interdependence in international 
issues, the need to deal with the contemporary issues in a multidimensional way, 
and the global trend towards democratization. One of the diplomats who shared 
these thoughts put it in the following words: 
 Today, diplomacy is evolving away from power-based issues towards humanitarian issues. Th e 
diplomats of today, unlike their colleagues 50 years ago, have to deal with issues such as the situa-
tion of the prisons, humanitarian aid, torture, environment, and women’s rights. 
 A smaller group of diplomats defined the actors of track two diplomacy in a nar-
rower manner, as constituted of only research institutions, businesspeople, or 
experts and unofficial people appointed by track one to support the negotiations 
following a framework agreement. For instance, one such diplomat categorized 
the legitimate actors of unofficial diplomacy as “those who were once diplomats 
engaging in unofficial activities and those who never held a diplomatic position, 
but still can engage in diplomatic activities such as businesspeople.” In this smaller 
second group, there was a tendency to limit track two diplomacy with either ‘off 
the record’ efforts outside of the official framework, undertaken by official and 
quasi-official people, or with the activities of certain types of actors only. Of these 
actors, the role of businesspeople was particularly and frequently mentioned, 
especially in reference to the “relative ease of getting business people together 
despite political problems.” Such diplomats, who have a functionalist perspective 
on track two, see economic interests as an essential motivating force for political 
cooperation. In line with this view, businesspeople were also mentioned for their 
ability to influence political circles. 
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 Th e Interaction between Official and Unofficial Diplomacy 
 Each interviewee made a unique contribution to the research with the different 
perspectives they provided on unofficial diplomacy. In general, however, the 
general attitudes of the interviewees can be grouped into three thematic catego-
ries: supportive, selective and suspicious. Diplomats in each category tended to 
think similarly about the legitimacy and contributions of unofficial diplomacy, 
harms that may be caused by track two diplomacy, and complementarity and 
coordination between track one and track two actors. Th ese groupings should be 
thought of as a continuum. At one extreme of this continuum are those who 
viewed track two diplomacy as a useful activity and as something that should be 
encouraged, regardless of conditions. Th is will be called the supportive attitude. 
Diplomats in the supportive group were the ones who usually had positive experi-
ences with track two actors. Th e other extreme is the suspicious attitude, which 
included diplomats who saw unofficial diplomacy as useless and potentially dan-
gerous in most cases. Finally, the opinions that fall into the middle of the con-
tinuum constitute the selective attitude. Th is group includes those who thought 
that unofficial diplomacy was useful depending upon the actor, issue, and timing. 
Such diplomats often had a chance to examine or experience track two in more 
than one setting. Table 1 indicates the distribution of Turkish diplomats into 
these categories. Th e following discussion will therefore be organized based on 
these general attitude groups. 
 Table 1: Distribution of Turkish diplomats according to their 
general attitudes towards track two 
Supportive Selective Suspicious
Distribution 9 10 8
Perspective  Useful  Useful depending on 
timing, actor, and issue 
 Hardly useful, more 
harmful than useful 
Desired Role Major or Crucial  Subsidiary  None 
Contributions of unofficial diplomacy 
 Th is section presents the diplomats’ views on the contributions of track two 
diplomacy. Diplomats in the supportive and selective categories believed unofficial 
diplomacy to be either always or sometimes useful, respectively. One of the most 
frequently mentioned ideas by the diplomats in these two groups was the inflexible 
nature of track one due to official ‘record’ concerns and the ‘official hat’ diplomats 
have to wear. Many diplomats in these groups emphasized that the flexible and 
creative atmosphere created by track two actors is conducive to generate new 
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ideas that may facilitate the resolution of certain conflicts. Some of them also 
mentioned that official diplomacy does not leave room to address the psycho-
logical aspects of conflicts, which is a shortcoming in developing new approaches 
to deep-rooted historical problems. Most of the diplomats in these categories 
stated that they saw dialogue attempts towards the disclosure or elimination of 
cultural and psychological barriers such as bias, distrust, and prejudice as useful, 
because they can help each side to build empathy and to understand each other’s 
perspective. 
 Diplomats in the supportive group stated that track one, while formulating or 
evaluating its policies, often benefits from the ideas generated at these unofficial 
meetings, because information garnered from multiple sources relevant to a 
conflict leads to better policies. A couple of diplomats gave the example of 
psychological barriers to Turkey’s integration with the European Union and how 
track one alone remains insufficient to address the historical bias and prejudice 
against the Turks in Europe. Th ey also mentioned the usefulness of track two 
efforts with Greece. However, some diplomats added that these dialogue efforts 
should be ‘realistic’ rather than like ‘romantic love duets,’ which illustrated their 
concern that dialogue without a clearly defined goal or task may not be useful at 
all. Additionally, some diplomats in the supportive group believed that such efforts 
should not only concentrate on people and problem-solving workshops, but also 
on the education system and the media. In order to further illustrate this point, 
these diplomats continuously referred to the negative impact of derogatory expres-
sions in Greek textbooks and in the Greek and Turkish media. Some of them 
mentioned that methods other than problem-solving workshops, such as student 
exchange and tourism, could also be incorporated into the repertoire of track two 
actors. As one diplomat stated: “there are different methods to make one say this 
new piece of information is different from what I was told before.” 
 Many diplomats in both the supportive and selective groups referred to the com-
municative contributions of track two diplomacy, especially when communica-
tion between countries is stuck or inadequate. From their perspective, such 
activities not only leave channels open, but also prevent the ossification of a prob-
lem. In this regard, many diplomats mentioned the face saving characteristic of 
track two diplomacy, especially when track one wants to maintain communica-
tion or start negotiations, but is reluctant to do so because of possible reactions at 
the domestic level. 
 Another contribution that is frequently mentioned by many diplomats in the 
supportive category is the reliability and confidentiality of unofficial actors while 
conveying a message. Th ese diplomats pointed out that no matter how correct the 
information given by official diplomacy is, it may be perceived as state propa-
ganda as long as it is uttered by an official mouth. On the other hand, some of the 
unofficial actors, whose impartiality and independence are trusted by the conflict-
ing parties, are often perceived as more reliable by the stakeholders in a conflict. 
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 Most of the diplomats in the supportive category also mentioned the need to 
achieve peace at every level of society through the implementation of a multi-level 
peace process. Such diplomats argued that states cannot reach every level within 
a society and that today’s inter-communal conflicts require peacemaking efforts 
to take place at all levels. Th is can only be achieved with the contributions of 
unofficial actors at the grassroots level. Some of the diplomats also referred to the 
importance of communication with interest groups in a particular country 
through unofficial actors. 
 Still another frequently mentioned benefit of unofficial diplomacy by support-
ive and selective groups was its contribution to the strengthening of democratic 
participation and to raising the public’s social and political awareness of interna-
tional issues. One diplomat stated that the participation of a group of Turkish 
women in an international women’s dialogue effort concerning the violations of 
women’s rights in Afghanistan would give a clear message to the Turkish govern-
ment that these women did not find the Turkish policy on this issue adequate. 
Another diplomat in the supportive group stated that he believed it is very 
beneficial for the public to take initiative and reclaim some control over their 
future by participating in international affairs. Still another argued that unofficial 
diplomacy helps official diplomacy to maintain its transparency, openness, and 
democratic form. Indeed, most of the diplomats in the supportive category stated 
that unofficial activities can bring especially positive results to bear in democratic 
societies, where track one is more receptive to public opinion. Following the 
statements of the diplomats in the supportive group, it can be argued that these 
diplomats’ views on the intentions and goals of track two diplomacy are parallel 
to the goals of track two diplomacy as articulated by the unofficial practitioners 
themselves. 
 Diplomats in the second category, who have a more selective approach towards 
track two diplomacy, shared most of the supportive group’s ideas about why and 
in which areas track two diplomacy is useful, such as in opening channels of com-
munication when the official channels are stuck and in offering alternative solu-
tions to conflicts. However, there are still differences between their general 
attitudes towards track two diplomacy. Unlike the supportive group, diplomats in 
the selective group expressed their approval of the contributions of track two 
diplomacy only under certain conditions. Th erefore, according to these diplo-
mats, track one can benefit only from the activities of ‘certain’ unofficial actors, at 
‘certain’ times, and on ‘certain’ issues. 
 With regard to actors, many diplomats in the selective group suggested that 
only certain unofficial actors, i.e. businesspeople, are useful. Such people empha-
sized that businesspeople are especially beneficial because they are equipped with 
political influence and they have economic motivations that can move the conflicts 
beyond political deadlock. Another frequently mentioned condition about the 
characteristics of actors was a preference for local and regional actors instead 
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of ‘foreign’ ones, as well as actors that are ‘impartial and unbiased.’ Most of the 
diplomats in the selective group suggested that if there were to be a ‘foreign’ 
unofficial third party, it must prove its reliability and objectivity towards both of 
the parties in the conflict before intervening. Some of them also stated that local 
or regional actors are more useful, because they know the conflict and culture 
better. Th ese diplomats listed ‘good will,’ ‘good intentions,’ and ‘constructive 
methods’ as requirements of track two actors for them to be regarded as beneficial. 
Some diplomats in this group also mentioned that unofficial diplomacy could 
only be useful if the track two actor had goals compatible with those of the official 
diplomacy. On the other hand, diplomats in the supportive group did not see 
compatibility between the goals of track one and track two as a prerequisite for 
receiving the benefits. Unlike the selective group, these diplomats even stated that 
multiple voices, disagreements, and incompatibilities were indicators of a well-
functioning system. 
 On the topics of selected issues and timing, the selective group thought that 
track two diplomacy would be more useful when: a) track two processes work 
parallel to the signing of a political agreement or afterwards during the peace 
building stage in order to improve relations at the community level, b) track two 
is carried out parallel to cooperation signals from track one, or c) if there is no 
violent political conflict. Diplomats who emphasized the first two conditions 
believed that without an overarching political framework, or at least a political 
willingness to cooperate between the parties, track two processes would be fruit-
less. Th ose diplomats who referred to the contributions of track two after a polit-
ical agreement is signed addressed the need for post-conflict rehabilitation and 
community building, especially in reference to the Bosnian example. Th erefore, 
selective diplomats not only identified conditions pertaining to specific actors, but 
also conditions pertaining to the timing of track two interventions. 
 Another major difference between the supportive and selective groups was that, 
unlike the diplomats in the supportive group who assumed that unofficial activi-
ties somehow influence the policy level, diplomats in the latter group expressed 
more pessimism and hesitation about the ability of track two to influence official 
policymaking. Th ey were also more skeptical about the interpersonal  consequences 
of the problem-solving workshops and dialogue groups. Unlike the diplomats in 
the supportive group who thought that ‘interpersonal relations matter in foreign 
policy,’ diplomats in the selective group emphasized the systemic and structural 
barriers as obstacles to peace and expressed doubts about the potential impact of 
improved interpersonal relations in challenging these structural barriers. Th e selec-
tive group diplomats also expressed concerns about the ‘re-entry problem’10 that is 
frequently experienced after the problem-solving workshops. Related to the re-
10) Re-entry problem refers to the difficulties the track two participants face when they go back to their 
societies after going through a series of meetings and changes in an isolated environment.
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entry problem, these diplomats argued that as long as governments and educa-
tional systems keep fueling adversarial attitudes, social-psychological barriers cannot 
be eliminated solely through problem-solving workshops. Some of these diplo-
mats gave as an example for failure the unofficial efforts concerning the Greek-
Turkish relations. Th ey expressed doubts about these efforts, stating that track 
two actors had been trying these methods for 20 years between Greeks and Turks 
in Cyprus without any significant results. 
 Finally, as far as the attitude of the suspicious group is concerned, diplomats in 
this group hardly believe in any contribution of track two diplomacy and view 
track two actors with suspicion regardless of the actor, timing, and issue. Th is 
attitude is significantly different from the previous two groups. Although some 
reservations were stated by diplomats in the supportive and selective groups as 
well, especially with regard to the reliability of some unofficial actors, these related 
only to a few, specific issues. 
 One significant point that was frequently mentioned by all diplomats in the 
suspicious group was that unofficial actors were manipulated by certain power 
groups, and especially by certain states, to serve their interests and purposes. Th ey 
believed that some states use unofficial actors to manipulate and shape the conflict 
in their favor and to impose the solution they desire. Diplomats in this group also 
accused track two actors for being biased, having double standards, and being 
used as propaganda tools. Th ey viewed their activities as distorting and mislead-
ing. A few diplomats mentioned that it is hard to believe in the sincerity of most 
of the NGOs, because while they react against an issue in one country and start a 
campaign against it in the international arena, they simply ignore similar prac-
tices in other countries. Almost all the diplomats in this group expressed doubts 
about the financial sources of track two activities and actors. Th ey said that most 
of the time the aims of the financial sponsors are not transparent and that they 
disguise their political affiliations and goals with the help of unofficial actors. One 
diplomat added that such NGOs deliberately select only people who can easily be 
manipulated, or who are already opponents of the regime, to participate in their 
problem-solving workshops. Th erefore, the outcomes of these workshops are por-
trayed as though it was the general tendency of the entire society in an attempt to 
manipulate the issue and the political efforts. Th e same diplomat mentioned that 
the workshops that focus on 50–100 people in total could not be regarded as 
legitimate due to their limited size and representation. Some diplomats in this 
group asserted that these workshops are like ‘platonic love affairs’ and that they 
are unsubstantiated. 
 Diplomats in this group exhibited suspicion toward the methods and philoso-
phy of conflict resolution in general and towards problem-solving workshops in 
particular. Many diplomats in this group made the point that the problem-solving 
workshops that bring unofficial people together are not useful as a method, because 
conflicts do not occur between individuals within societies, but simply between 
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competing national interests. Plus, conflicts that arise from history or culture 
could not be overcome by outside intervention or by problem-solving workshops 
that are limited in scope. One diplomat stated that Western conflict resolution 
experts, or think tanks and research organizations, often assess conflicts in ‘labo-
ratory conditions’ and then they try to implement these sterile ideas to a ‘real’ 
situation that most of the time differs drastically from what is simulated in ‘labo-
ratories.’ Another diplomat stated that there are cultural and historical biases 
towards Turkey in Europe that are continuously perpetuated by the media and are 
always reflected in the activities of the unofficial channels in this region. Th ere-
fore, these channels are far from impartial and sincere in their efforts. In sum, the 
views expressed by the suspicious group suggest that track two diplomacy is hardly 
perceived as legitimate and its contributions are not fully recognized. 
 Perception of Harm 
 It has already been noted that diplomats in the suspicious group view track two 
not as useful, but instead as rather harmful. Besides this suspicious attitude, dip-
lomats in the supportive and selective groups also mentioned specific situations 
where track two diplomacy could be harmful. Although the perception of harms 
among the supportive and selective categories converged on many points, the 
former distinguished itself from the latter with respect to the methods in dealing 
with these situations. Th is subsection will discuss the perceptions of supportive 
and selective groups with regard to harms. 
 Many diplomats mentioned that if the unofficial actor has a “narrow and 
one-sided approach,” either based on prejudice or inadequate information about 
the context of the conflict, it can be harmful. Another frequently mentioned 
potential harm was related to the possibility of the manipulation of the organiza-
tion or the person participating in track two activities. In line with this argument, 
several diplomats said that if there are personal benefits involved in the track 
two effort, such as profit or propaganda, the consequence of such an effort might 
be harmful. 
 A third frequently mentioned potential harm, especially by the diplomats in 
the selective category, was that if unofficial diplomacy “overwhelms” official diplo-
macy, it may cause problems. By “overwhelming,” some diplomats meant the 
disclosure of track one secrets in unofficial meetings, while others meant creating 
“undue expectations” for the other party or signaling “rosy messages” when the 
official negotiation position is less flexible. For this reason, some of the diplomats 
suggested that the boundaries of unofficial diplomacy need to be drawn more 
clearly. Otherwise, false expectations may be created on the other side, which in 
turn might contribute to the further escalation of the conflict and to the hamper-
ing of the efforts of track one. Th ese diplomats mentioned that in case of such 
damage, it is very difficult to fix the problem or reverse the damage. As a solution, 
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some diplomats suggested that track two diplomacy needs to be realistic, responsible 
for the consequences of its actions, and it needs to be sensitive and familiar with 
the interests of all parties in the conflict. Others bolstered this idea by stating that 
track two diplomacy should be careful “not to transcend its area of expertise.” 
 Another point mentioned by some diplomats, especially in the selective cate-
gory, concerned the harms caused by the ideological stance of some unofficial 
actors. For instance, such diplomats saw unofficial diplomacy as potentially harm-
ful, if the actor is a radical Islamist or an advocate of a particular ethnic group. 
Th ey think that such unofficial actors try to distort the issue and mobilize people 
around their specific cause, rather than searching for a resolution to the dispute 
or aiming at problem-solving and reconciliation. Th ey added that such actors can 
also damage the “image” of official diplomacy and the country they represent. 
Concern with the “image” of the country was mentioned quite a few times by 
different diplomats in various contexts. “Damaging the image of the country” 
was perceived to be one of the most important harms, which indicates the notion 
that track two diplomacy can potentially become a “meddler” with the represen-
tation mission of official diplomacy. In other words, these diplomats see track two 
diplomacy as potentially harmful, if the latter intends to represent the country in 
a way not approved by official diplomacy. Th is issue is of critical importance for 
the Turkish diplomats, given that the “representation” of the “modern and secular 
Republic” is one of the pillars of official Turkish diplomacy. 
 A significant number of diplomats pointed to the harms caused by ‘biased’ and 
‘hypocritical’ activities of some unofficial actors, those of NGOs in particular. 
Although this point was stated before as one of the primary concerns of the suspi-
cious group, unlike this group, diplomats in other categories did not think that 
unofficial channels were not useful at all because “some of them are manipulated 
and used by some states for the defamation of a particular country.” Th e response 
of the diplomats in general was that harms caused by “intentional defamation” 
are very difficult to erase once world public opinion is formed as a result of such 
manipulation. One diplomat added that: “the only thing you can do [at that 
point] is to find out the reasons for the [destructive defamation] behavior.” 
Another diplomat with the selective attitude suggested “to try to convince [such 
actors] to change their destructive behaviors through dialogue, and if this doesn’t 
work, take legal action if possible and appropriate.” 
 Concerning the harms caused by track two actors, a few diplomats in the selec-
tive group addressed the harms caused by “foreign unofficial actors.” Th e reason 
mentioned was that they was not necessarily familiar with the “real issue,” espe-
cially the “complexity of the conflicts in a particular region of the world.” Th ese 
diplomats suggested that such actors should be more familiar with the issues and 
culture of the region. 
 In sum, it can be argued that most of the harms mentioned by the diplomats 
in the supportive and selective groups are related to the characteristics of the ‘actors’ 
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of track two diplomacy rather than the nature of the track two activity itself. Th is 
is clearly seen in the arguments raised concerning issues such as bias, prejudice, 
and lack of adequate knowledge and skills in track two actors. 
 As far as how these harms or potential harms can be avoided or eliminated, 
most of the diplomats in the supportive category offered a ‘self-control’ or a ‘checks 
and balances’ mechanism. Th ey also pointed to the fact that this is the area where 
Turkey is facing difficulties with track two diplomacy, because these mechanisms 
are not working efficiently enough. Again suggested by some diplomats in this 
category was the need for transparency, both in official and unofficial diplomacy, 
and a mechanism that would help people to know “who is who” in track two 
diplomacy. Another frequently suggested method was to increase the “exchange 
of ideas” and “to keep contact between the two channels.” Some of the diplomats 
also referred to the need for more “responsible behavior” on behalf of track two 
actors concerning the problem of creating “undue expectations”, but did not 
specify any particular method. 
 An interesting perspective was put forward by a few diplomats in the supportive 
category regarding the issue of harm. Th ese diplomats offered a relativist view on 
the issue through consideration of the “subjective nature of harm”. One diplomat 
said the following: 
 I don’t think, in open, liberal, and democratic societies, unofficial diplomacy can be harmful. If you 
have problems with these notions, then you begin worrying about the acts of unofficial diplomacy 
and say that it can be ‘sometimes harmful’. If it is a totally anti-democratic and closed system, then 
the regime says that unofficial activities are of no use at all and they are always harmful. . . . In 
democratic societies, official diplomacy cannot say anything like this. In societies like Turkey, that 
are in between, and are trying to consolidate democracy, it will depend on the person, subject, and 
the organization. Th en, official diplomacy becomes suspicious and wonders whether they will talk 
about one of the shortcomings of the country. 
 Th e discussion on the subjectivity of harms was further enriched with one diplo-
mat’s statement that it is inevitable that official diplomacy will consider every-
thing that threatens its existence as harmful. Along the same lines, yet another 
diplomat from the supportive group mentioned that the perception of harm 
depends on the type of the regime and on the political culture. Th is diplomat 
continued that, rather than viewing harmful situations as “white and black”, there 
are “tones of gray,” and as long as there is “good faith and responsibility,” track 
two diplomacy is not harmful. 
 As far as the methods suggested for the elimination of harms are concerned, 
most of the diplomats in the selective group suggested contact, dialogue, or at least 
‘information exchange’ between track two and track one actors, so that the latter 
can inform the former about potential problems. On the other hand, most of the 
diplomats in the supportive category suggested that track two actors need at least 
to be aware of the activities of track one in that area, regardless of whether or not 
they agree with its policy. 
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 In sum, a major distinction between the selective and supportive groups emerged 
with regard to the elimination of harms. While the selective group preferred a 
more controlling approach towards track two, the supportive group was con-
sciously more reluctant to portray this type of attitude. 
 Coordination Between Official and Unofficial Actors 
 Identifying the situations in which track two and track one can work in comple-
mentary and coordinated ways is a major challenge for the scholars and practi-
tioners interested in track two diplomacy. Scholars such as Crocker, et al. (1999), 
Cuhadar (2004), Keashly and Fisher (1996), Kriesberg (1996), and Nan (2000) 
addressed this challenge in different ways, but at the end, all concurred that the 
complementary use of various third party methods increases the effectiveness of 
overall peace efforts. Of these scholars, Keashly and Fisher (1996) and Nan (2000) 
dealt with the question of complementarity and coordination within a “contin-
gency approach” framework. Th e contingency approach suggested that the type 
of third party intervention (e.g. negotiation, mediation, consultation, arbitra-
tion/power mediation, development aid) should match the characteristics of the 
conflict and what is needed at that particular conflict stage (e.g. discussion, polar-
ization, segregation, destruction) (Keashly and Fisher 1996: 245). In this frame-
work, Keashly and Fisher (1996: 257) advocated a “coordinated sequenced 
approach” in which they discouraged “over-reliance” on one particular third party 
intervention method and encouraged a “healthy eclecticism” of various methods. 
However, they argued that consultation/facilitation, which can be carried out by 
unofficial actors and aims at improving relationships and communication between 
the parties, is relevant and complementary to other third party methods in almost 
all stages of a conflict, albeit in differing intervention sequences. Following in 
their footsteps, Nan (2000: 332) found that “long-term unofficial facilitated joint 
analysis” in between negotiations is highly complementary to official negotia-
tions. By long-term unofficial facilitated joint analysis, Nan referred to the 
unofficial activities undertaken by a small number of third parties with high level 
representatives over a long time period. 
 In addition to these scholars, Kriesberg (1996) suggested two types of coordi-
nation that can take place between various peacemaking actors according to the 
timing of the intermediary efforts, “sequential” and “contemporaneous”. While 
sequential efforts refer to the third party activities that follow one another, 
contemporaneous efforts refer to the simultaneous activities of more than one 
third party. 
 Although these studies do not necessarily deal with track one and track two 
relationship per se, they have contributed to our understanding of situations under 
which track one and track two can work in complementary ways and when coor-
dination between the two is necessary. However, research and theory building in 
this area is still at an early stage. One issue that requires further inquiry is to 
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understand the intentions and perceptions of track one towards coordination 
with track two. Do they think coordination is necessary? What motivates them to 
think that they need coordination? In what areas do they think coordination with 
track two is more relevant? Understanding track one’s perspectives concerning 
these questions will help us think about track one and track two coordination in 
a way that involves the interests of both stakeholders in this area. 
 As in the previous sections, views of diplomats towards coordination vary with 
the suspicious, selective, and supportive attitude groups. For the suspicious, since 
unofficial actors are viewed as not useful, but rather harmful, it is very difficult to 
talk about the means of coordination with this group. Th e major barrier to coor-
dination with such diplomats is track two’s lack of legitimacy. However, it 
is still very important to understand the reason why track two is not seen as 
legitimate, because different reasons may require different strategies for track 
two practitioners. 
 For some diplomats in this group, the suspicious attitude towards track two is 
consistent with the views they expressed about civil society and NGOs in general 
as having been “formed against the state, they will not want to cooperate with the 
state.” Such thinking may be due to their lack of knowledge about, and limited 
experience with, civil society, and may be due to the political culture in which the 
relationship between the state and civil society has evolved differently from the 
one in Western European societies.11 For example, the concept of the NGO did 
not exist until the 1990s, whereas the more traditional term vakif (waqf ) was used 
to designate civil society organizations, however, these were not completely inde-
pendent of the state realm, especially in modern times.12 For diplomats with such 
a worldview, it is harder for track two to change this perception and eliminate the 
source of non-recognition and thus, coordination or any cooperative work 
between such track one actors and track two may simply not be feasible. 
 On the other hand, for the majority of diplomats in the suspicious group, track 
two is not seen as legitimate, because track two activities are not capable of finding 
solutions to the ‘essence’ of the problems, but rather offer palliative solutions and 
are manipulated, non-transparent, and used by certain powers to impose their 
own solutions in a conflict. For suspicious diplomats who state this as the reason 
for non-recognition, coordination may be relatively easier. For coordination or 
cooperative work to happen with such diplomats, trust building, improving the 
transparency and accountability of the NGOs, and mutual recognition of the 
importance of each other’s work will likely help the situation. In addition, track 
two actors need to clarify and communicate their intentions and funding sources, 
and assure the diplomats of their impartiality in order to prevent situations in 
11) For an example of scholarly discussion on how state-civil society relations in the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkey evolved, see Bernard Lewis 2002, chapter 5; and especially Serif Mardin, 1995. 
12)  For further information on the waqfs as civil society institutions in Islamic societies, see Lewis Ibid. 
pp, 110–111. 
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which the track two effort is perceived as something imposed by a “foreign state.” 
If that is the case, coordination between diplomats of the country subject to track 
two intervention and the ‘foreign intervener’ is difficult to establish, especially in 
countries like Turkey, where a painful history of foreign intervention by ‘Western 
powers’ still constitutes a lively part of the collective memory.13 
 For diplomats in the selective and supportive groups, views on coordination 
vary. Th ere are many crosscutting arguments mentioned by diplomats in both 
groups. However, diplomats in the selective group tend to favor coordination in 
sequential efforts over contemporaneous ones, as opposed to diplomats in the 
supportive group, who tend to recognize the value of coordination both in sequen-
tial and contemporaneous interaction between track one and track two. 
 A primary reason for the selective group’s preference for the sequential mode is 
the belief that track two actors can hamper the efforts of track one if their efforts 
take place before a political-legal groundwork is established. Such convictions of 
the selective group have already been mentioned in the section on perceptions of 
harms in regard to the conditions put forward concerning the timing of track two 
intervention. Lack of coordination is harmful for most diplomats in this category 
and will make track two efforts “unrealistic,” especially concerning “security” 
issues. What one diplomat said is quite representative of this attitude: 
 Th e unofficial efforts per se do not bring any results. Th is is a reality. Th ey can play a supportive and 
catalyst role especially after a rapprochement occurs at the political level. Th e primary condition is 
the political will of the disputants. Once there is a sign of political will, unofficial channels can 
further improve this cooperation. 
 It can be contended that these diplomats prefer the coordination of sequential 
interaction not only because they fear “meddling” of track two diplomacy in their 
work (if conducted simultaneously), but also because some perceive track two to 
be a substitute for track one. However, although strong preference for sequential 
interaction between track one and track two was voiced adamantly by these dip-
lomats, which exact sequence they preferred was not adequately clarified. Although 
many of them stated a strong preference for track two following the official signal 
of rapprochement, the other sequential option was not completely repudiated. 
 For some other diplomats in the selective category, another prerequisite for 
coordination is “professionalism” and the proven credibility of the track two actor. 
Th ese diplomats think that coordination is not meaningful if the organization 
lacks “professional perspective on the conflict” or a “credible reputation” in the 
eyes of the diplomats and the public. 
13)  Th e intervention of the Western powers in the Ottoman Empire on behalf of non-Muslim minorities 
and later on Arab Muslims, which culminated with the occupation of the country by the Allied forces and 
the disintegration of the Empire is a major historical factor that underlie the skepticism of many officials 
concerning any Western involvement in the domestic affairs, especially on behalf of ethnic and religious 
communities. For a more detailed discussion, see Bernard Lewis 2002 especially chapters 2, 5, and 6.
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 In the supportive group, diplomats are more prone to coordination in both 
sequential and contemporaneous efforts between the two tracks. One major 
difference from the previous group is that they do not see unofficial actors as 
potential “meddlers” if they are engaged in activities simultaneously with official 
diplomacy. Also, all of the diplomats in the supportive group recognized track two 
diplomacy as a complementary method, unlike some diplomats in the selective 
group who saw it as a substitute for, or as in competition to, official diplomacy. 
Diplomats with a supportive attitude thought that the issue of incompatibility 
between track one and track two is “very normal and something that needs to be 
accepted by official diplomacy” and an “indication of a well-functioning system 
in which the actors challenge one another for progress,” unlike many diplomats 
in the selective group who thought that incompatibility between the goals of the 
two tracks hampers the work of track one. A diplomat from the supportive group 
stated: 
 Th ere is a trend towards multilateralism and multi-dimensionalism. Official diplomacy is now more 
open and allows inputs from various channels. Th is is really important in avoiding situations like 
Yugoslavia. It is important that these channels work with each other compatibly. By compatibly, I 
don’t mean that everybody should agree on the same thing. When you formulate principles that will 
regulate coordination, you should also keep in mind that there is the danger of hampering the 
dynamics of change. However, still, coordination is the best thing you can do to ensure that the 
unofficial channels make their voices heard. It is really important for different parties, groups, to 
hear and understand one another for better policy actions. 
 As far as the achievement and maintenance of coordination are concerned, there 
are various suggestions shared by diplomats in both the supportive and selective 
attitude groups. Th e bottom line is that many agree on some sort of a mechanism 
that will at least provide exchange of information between the two tracks. Th e 
need for information exchange was expressed by many diplomats. One stated 
that: “Maybe there are lots of citizens and organizations that strive for the achieve-
ment of the same goal, but either they are not aware of one another’s activities or 
they are aware but there is lack of a mechanism that will facilitate communication 
and coordination between them.” Most of the diplomats in the selective and sup-
portive categories are open to input and new ideas that can be offered by unofficial 
actors, even if they express different uses for coordination. For some, coordina-
tion is necessary just to be able to understand the concerns and perspectives of 
one another, so that each side knows what to expect from the other and learn each 
other’s position in order to avoid impairing the collective efforts. For those, 
“mutual dialogue” and “informatory sessions” are the preferred ways of to achieve 
coordination. On the other hand, for others, coordination is necessary to reevalu-
ate and improve the current foreign policy options with the help of new ideas 
generated during the track two meetings. As one diplomat stated: 
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 Since track two diplomacy can be useful in playing a catalyst role between the track one of the par-
ties in conflict, it should be close to both sides in order to play a bridge role. If the information 
obtained in the problem-solving workshops, such as why the other side fears from taking a further 
step, is conveyed to the decision makers, then the policymaking process can be more constructive . . . 
[Coordination] is useful because you receive more information from unofficial channels directly [so 
that] you can better evaluate and change your understanding of a problem. 
 Diplomats in the supportive and selective groups were careful to emphasize that 
coordination does not mean control. Most of the diplomats in these two catego-
ries indicated sensitivity in maintaining the credibility and independence of the 
track two actors if track one and track two efforts are coordinated. Th ey felt the 
need to mention that coordination should not turn into track two becoming a 
“puppet” of track one. One diplomat preferred the phrase “democratic exchange 
of ideas” to coordination. Another expressed concern saying that “official diplo-
macy should not behave like an overprotective parent towards unofficial actors.” 
Yet another one noted: 
 When the interests and goals of the two tracks are compatible, official diplomacy supports the 
efforts of unofficial diplomacy. But it is important to protect the credibility of NGOs as independent 
entities, because they are respected in what they say because of their independence. 
 In sum, as opposed to the suspicious group, coordination is well accepted and 
desired by the diplomats in the supportive and selective groups. For many of the 
diplomats in these categories, coordination is perceived as a mechanism to make 
peacemaking efforts more effective and to improve foreign policy options. 
 Comparing the Perceptions of Turkish and American Diplomats 
 It was noted earlier that the survey among Turkish diplomats was designed in a 
way to facilitate comparison with the sample of American diplomats surveyed by 
Chataway (1998). In this section, the findings of this comparative analysis will be 
discussed, with reference to both the similarities and differences between the 
Turkish and American diplomats regarding their views on track two efforts. Th is 
discussion results in the suggestion of ideas pertaining to the sources of these 
similarities and differences in order to lay the groundwork for further research in 
this area. 
 Similar Perceptions 
 When compared, Turkish and American diplomats expressed similar concerns 
and ideas about track two diplomacy using a similar language. Most of these 
similarities seem to be shaped by the nature of their shared professional occupa-
tion and a common diplomatic language, symbols, rituals, and behavioral pat-
terns. One of the similarities that can be traced to the common professional 
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occupation is the notion of “flexibility.” Th e formal structure of track one and the 
official record problem was often mentioned by both groups of diplomats. Both 
Turkish and American diplomats addressed the inflexible nature of official diplo-
macy and indicated that track two, on the contrary, is flexible and can contribute 
to communication efforts. In this regard, US diplomats referred to the inflexibility 
of official diplomacy and indicated that official positions may constitute a barrier 
to free and creative communication (Chataway 1998: 275). 
 Another similarity related to the theme of flexibility is that both groups of 
diplomats referred to the contribution of track two diplomacy in reaching out to 
groups that official diplomacy cannot easily reach.14 Yet, another area of shared 
concern with regard to the inflexibility of official diplomacy is that in both groups 
there are diplomats who recognized the extra work burden placed on them because 
of the requirements of the changing international environment. Some American 
diplomats described the role of track two in such an environment as “out-sourcing,” 
as a way of filling the gap created by the increased burden on official diplomacy 
(Chataway 1998: 272). Similarly, some Turkish diplomats addressed the inade-
quacy of track one in dealing with the diversification in the issues and the need 
for expert involvement. For both groups of diplomats, removal of the constraints 
on unofficial dialogue imposed by the Cold-War context and the spread of democ-
racy resulted in the increasing involvement of citizens and thus, contributed to 
the development of track two diplomacy.15 
 For both Turkish (selective and supportive ones) and American diplomats, “the 
creative and informal” nature of track two is considered to be useful. As one 
American diplomat stated in Chataway (1998: 274): “[interactive conflict resolu-
tion] allows the testing out of new ideas and sharing information under the cover 
of academic discourse, without formal commitment.” Similar comments were 
made by Turkish diplomats, such as: 
 [O]fficial diplomacy can force you to stay within certain boundaries. It has certain rigid rules and 
norms. It has limited communication and negotiation methods. What you can do with official 
diplomacy is restricted with these boundaries, . . . but as an unofficial actor . . . you can be creative 
and obtain interesting information and responses. 
 A second theme that can be traced to the common occupational profession is 
found in the arguments made by the diplomats of both countries concerning 
national interest. Track one often embodies a discourse of ‘national interest,’ while 
track two has been built upon a ‘non-violent’ and ‘human relations’ discourse. 
Th is difference manifests itself in the statements of several interviewees. For exam-
ple one Turkish diplomat argued: 
14)  See Chataway, 1998, p. 271 for the American diplomats’ views. 
15)  For the American group, see Chataway, Ibid., p. 272. 
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 I don’t believe in the concept of conflicts between the groups in societies. Societies do not conflict 
with one another. Each state has continuous national interests. [Each state] has national interests 
that are prioritized and the respective governments follow these national interests. Th erefore, 
conflicts do not exist between people, but rather between these national interests. 
 Th e same discourse is expressed in the statements of some American diplomats in 
which they viewed unofficial diplomacy with derision regarding the issues of what 
they called high priority. Th ese issues include disputes involving the United States 
security interests and top secret issues in which the interference of track two 
diplomacy is discouraged.16 Moreover, both Turkish and American diplomats 
expressed concerns about track two diplomacy causing “undue expectations” or 
“unrealistic expectations” on the other party that can damage the interests of the 
country or further complicate the situation. Some diplomats in both groups 
accused the unofficial actors as uninformed about the complexity of the issues 
and, thus, creating unrealistic solutions.17 
 A third theme that is similar is the ‘representativeness and inclusiveness’ of 
official diplomacy. It can be inferred from many diplomats’ views that, while they 
see official diplomacy as inclusive of all interests and representative of and carry-
ing the responsibility of the whole nation, they perceive track two diplomacy as 
focused and experienced in a specific issue and with limited representation, scope, 
and responsibility. Some Turkish diplomats argued that official diplomacy pro-
tects the interests of the whole nation whereas track two usually deals with the 
interests of a specific group in the society or acts in favor of a specific issue. Simi-
larly, some American diplomats suggested that track two should not negotiate the 
specifics of an agreement, but instead focus on broad goals and objectives, because 
unlike official diplomats, they lack a broader perspective on the situation (Chata-
way 1998: 279). On a similar account, some Turkish diplomats said that unofficial 
actors such as NGOs are established based on specific causes for which they advo-
cate in their activities, whereas, they argued, official diplomacy has to take the 
interests of every segment of the society into consideration. However, this was not 
necessarily a negative attribute placed on the unofficial actors. Several diplomats 
explicitly referred to this subject as a positive attribute of unofficial diplomacy, 
because the issue-specific focus of the unofficial actors is beneficial for official 
diplomacy since diplomats are no longer capable of paying attention to every 
issue. From these arguments, one can easily infer the contradicting views of the 
diplomats on the specific and issue-focused nature of unofficial actors. While one 
view suggests that the specific knowledge and professional experience of unofficial 
actors is appreciated, the other one is concerned about the overvaluation of a 
particular issue or interest. 
16)  For such comments see Ibid. pp. 274–276. 
17)  See p. 280 for Chataway’s example on this theme. 
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 Another similarity is that some diplomats in both groups (in the Turkish case, 
especially some of those in the suspicious and selective groups) perceived track 
two actors as a threat or as a replacement of official diplomacy. Th ese diplomats 
needed to reiterate that track two cannot replace diplomacy and that official diplo-
macy is the only venue to make final agreements.18 Both Turkish and American 
diplomats also raised concerns about the selfish motivations of unofficial actors. 
However, this was a more persistently mentioned theme among the Turkish dip-
lomats in all categories, albeit in varying degrees, especially concerning the fund-
ing of NGOs by private interest groups. Beneath this attitude of some diplomats 
from both nationalities, there is a tendency to think that track one is more impor-
tant and should always have the upper hand. Another revelation of this attitude 
can be seen in comments that suggest that track one sees its own issues as “hard 
core” or “high priority,” and track two as dealing with issues of secondary or sub-
sidiary importance. Such perceptions existed in some American and Turkish dip-
lomats’ (especially ones in the selective group) statements regarding the need for 
consistency and compatibility between the norms and goals of track one and track 
two. Similarly, some diplomats see unofficial activities as the extension of official 
diplomacy. As Chataway (1998: 274) stated: 
 To some interviewees citizen-diplomats were conceived as an extension of the diplomatic arm, a 
tool to be utilized in the service of diplomatic ends, however coercive ... [Within] these statements 
is the sense that the norms and goals of Track II diplomacy should be consistent with those of tra-
ditional diplomacy. . . .
 Parallel views were also expressed by some Turkish diplomats in the sense that 
unofficial diplomacy should be compatible with and supportive of official diplo-
macy in order for the latter to reach its goals. Many diplomats, both Turkish and 
American, also made comments that prioritized the timing of official interac-
tions, by stating that a political framework has to exist prior to the involvement 
of unofficial actors. Similar to the preferences put forth by Turkish diplomats in 
the selective group, some American diplomats think that track two diplomacy is 
good before or after an agreement, but not during the official negotiations (Chat-
away 1998: 276). In this regard, diplomats in both groups mentioned specific 
time periods in which unofficials are more helpful. Some American diplomats 
mentioned the contributions of unofficial actors in putting out fires or when rela-
tions have completely broken down (Chataway 1998: 276–277). 
 In sum, most of the similarities in the perceptions of Turkish and American 
diplomats with respect to track two diplomacy can be traced to the shared under-
standings of their common profession. Th eir common profession leads them to 
articulate similar concerns and shared perceptions about the contributions of 
track two diplomacy. 
18) For American diplomats’ views on this issue, see Ibid., p. 277.
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 Different Perceptions 
 Some thoughts of Turkish diplomats on track two diplomacy were very different 
from the perceptions of the American diplomats. One striking difference is the 
argument put forth by Turkish diplomats that ‘unofficial actors (are) manipulated 
and used by certain foreign states.’ Th is view was not mentioned at all by any 
American diplomat in the research findings published by Chataway, despite the 
fact that they did not welcome unofficial diplomacy warmly with regard to the 
issues concerning the United States directly.19 Many Turkish diplomats across 
different groups showed skepticism towards foreign unofficial actors for various 
reasons, such as not being knowledgeable enough, trying to impose Eurocentric 
perspectives, and being manipulated and used by certain foreign states. Interest-
ingly, diplomats who expressed such skeptical views came from many different 
departments ranging from the Middle East and Cyprus to the European and 
NATO bureaus of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. 
 Within this skeptical view, several Turkish diplomats, unlike American diplo-
mats, stated that the historical traumas and the psychology of the people in the 
midst of deep-rooted conflicts in “our” region cannot be understood and dealt 
with by European “ethnocentric” values. Th erefore, for the above mentioned rea-
sons, many diplomats stated a preference for “local or regional unofficial actors” 
or for those who really know the characteristics of the region and the country. 
Otherwise, the efforts of foreign intermediaries may be titled as “biased,” as artic-
ulated by many diplomats. Th is has important practical implications for organi-
zations in the field especially in their efforts to establish collaborative efforts 
between the local-regional-international organizations. If international organiza-
tions collaborate with locally or regionally acclaimed and credible organizations, 
they are more likely to increase their influence on track one of the local govern-
ments. In countries like Turkey, where the history of foreign intervention by 
Western powers has a very negative connotation in the collective memory, col-
laboration of international organizations with respected local organizations can 
alleviate this suspicion and sensitivity. 
 Another significant point put forth by the Turkish diplomats, unlike American 
diplomats, was the notion of “consent”, especially in reference to their experience 
with track two in Cyprus. Consent of the parties in conflict about who the third 
party will be and the recognition of the “equality” of each party in the unofficial 
meetings were considered as crucial by several diplomats. Th us, concern with 
equal treatment can be cited as another factor in the sensitivity zone alongside 
“impartiality” and “sincerity” of the unofficial actors. 
 Political culture, that is shaped as part of the political experience in a nation, is 
another dimension manifested in the perceptions of diplomats. Th ere are diff er-
ences among Turkish and American diplomats in this regard. For instance, the 
19) For this specific concern, see Ibid., p. 275. 
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debate over radical Islamists and the potential unofficial activities that may be carried 
out by these organizations was one of the primary concerns of the Turkish diplo-
mats.20 In fact, for some diplomats this was a reason for viewing unofficial actors 
with suspicion. Th ese diplomats expressed concerns about damage to the “secular 
regime” and the “image” of the country if such unofficial actors were allowed to 
engage in unofficial diplomatic activities as they pleased. 
 Another manifestation of diff erent political cultures revealed itself in the state-
ments of the diplomats concerning the historical experience with democratiza-
tion and the incorporation of new ideas generated during the unofficial meetings 
at the political level. As some diplomats stated, the perception of track two in 
Turkey is closely related to the attitude towards civil society in the country. In the 
Turkish context, as mentioned earlier under the suspicious category, in one diplo-
mat’s words “most of the time such organizations are formed against the state.” 
However, this attitude was not the case for any of the American diplomats. 
 In sum, differences reported between the two groups of diplomats can be attrib-
uted to several factors. Th ese are issue sensitivities, country differences (size, power, 
service provider or not), and political culture (state-civil society relations). Ameri-
can diplomats, on the ‘global service provider’ end of this relationship, did not 
mention some of the issues addressed by Turkish diplomats, who are situated at 
the ‘service receiving’ end. In addition, most of the concerns expressed by Turkish 
diplomats were particular to the Turkish political context, as the Turkish diplo-
mats themselves emphasized. 
 Conclusion 
 Th e number of track two initiatives has increased throughout the world in the last 
couple of decades with the expectation that track two would be useful and com-
plementary to track one processes. However, despite a few empirical studies 
recently conducted on complementarity (e.g. Nan 2000), the idea that track two 
efforts are complementary to official negotiations and that official actors welcome 
these is still just an assumption held by many track two practitioners. In order to 
fortify this proposition, there is still a need for further empirical inquiry about 
when and how track two diplomacy is complementary to track one, and a need 
to know the actual perceptions of the official parties in these efforts. In addition, 
any attempt to understand the perceptions of track one actors should also include 
the track one actors of non-Western countries, as they are often the ‘receivers’ of 
track two initiatives. Th is study tries to remedy the second deficiency by present-
ing evidence from a survey of Turkish diplomats including their views of track 
two efforts and comparing these views to those of American diplomats. 
20)  It should be noted that these interviews were conducted before September 11, 2001. If American 
diplomats were to be interviewed today, they may express similar concerns as well. 
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 One important finding of this research that has implications for practice is 
that, similar to the track one diplomatic community in the US, the diplomatic 
community in Turkey is not homogenous. Th ere is a spectrum of attitudes, ranging 
from very suspicious to very supportive, within track one. It is important for track 
two practitioners to know this attitudinal variation within track one, especially in 
order to develop appropriate ‘insider strategies’ aiming to work alongside track 
one. Th is article showed that within track one, certain types of diplomats are 
more willing to consider input from track two and that there are some sensitivi-
ties that diplomats of different countries agree on, due to their common profes-
sion. Th e article also showed that some concerns are idiosyncratic and unique to 
the diplomats of each country, due to national differences and because of location 
at either the ‘receiving’ or ‘service providing’ end. Of these sensitivities, some can 
easily be alleviated by the track two practitioners through trust building and 
better communication, such as the fear of track one diplomats about being taken 
over by track two. However, others are more difficult to alleviate, such as the deep 
suspicion among some Turkish diplomats about the legitimacy of track two actors. 
 Another finding of this article that has a theoretical implication is that it indi-
cates a gap between the few empirical studies that exist on complementarity and 
the perceptions of some diplomats about what is useful and complementary to 
track one. Nan (2000: 332) found that “long term unofficial joint analysis in 
between negotiations” is highly complementary to track one negotiations. Despite 
this finding, there is no clear agreement among either the Turkish or the Ameri-
can diplomats with regard to the optimal timing of track two activities. While 
some diplomats see contemporaneous track two activities as useful, others see 
them as “meddling;” this latter group preferring sequential efforts instead. Future 
work in this area needs to address why the gap between the perceptions of the 
diplomats and the findings suggested by empirical work exists, by trying to better 
understand the motivations of diplomats, including those from countries not 
covered in this research. 
 Empirical work is deficient concerning some other issues that were raised by 
diplomats as well. For example, are track two and track one more complementary 
when they have compatible goals, when there is no violence, or when track two is 
held with certain types of actors, like business people, as suggested by some dip-
lomats? Additional empirical work and further theory building are needed in this 
area that goes beyond a limited number of case studies. 
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